In this paper, we study a model economy that can account for the distribution of payments within a day. In our model, debtors choose when to arrive at the settlement location. Concomitant with choosing their arrival, debtors are making a production decision. We assume there is a cost to arriving early; that is, late-arrival is associated with a technology that dominates early arrival/production. Second, we treat the debtor's choice as hidden from creditors. We derive conditions in which the planner allocate production to each type. In the decentralized setting, there is an arbitrage condition that is consistent with a positive intraday rate. The central bank may be able to implement the planner's allocation with a proper intraday interest rate. In some cases, the intraday rate is positive.
Introduction
In the United States, the payment system settles a very large volume of transactions. In there was a sequencing friction. He found that both inside and outside money could be valued in equilibrium. In particular, outside money was valued as the means of gross settlement while inside money was valued as a means of …nancing current consumption.
Inside money was risky in the sense that creditors and debtors were not necessarily matched at the settlement location. Freeman speci…ed a secondary market for inside money when the timing friction resulted in such mismatches. Freeman's friction was exogenously determined and involved arrival and departures at the settlement location. Because debtors may not arrive to settle when creditors needed their liquidity, old-age creditor's consumption is at risk. More speci…cally, Freeman showed that with insu¢ cient liquidity, IOUs traded in the secondary market might sell at less than par. In Freeman's model economy, the planner's allocation called for consumption to be equal across all old-age creditors, leaving open the question: is there a policy in the decentralized economy that would implement the …rst-best allocation? Freeman showed that the planner's allocation could be implemented in a decentralized economy if the central bank o¤ered zero-interest, intra-period discount window loans.
In subsequent papers, researchers focused on two issues. Green (1997) under what conditions do liquidity-providing institutions have a role? Mills demonstrates that spatially separated agents must have no memory. With memory, outside money is not necessary to settle debt. 1 Kahn and Roberds (2008) seek to understand money's role as the means of …nal settlement. They characterize money's role as consisting of transferability and …nality. Transferability addresses the risk borne by third parties as they accept the debt as a means of payment. If, for example, third-party acceptance of IOUs means that debt is observationally equivalent to money, then the IOUs possess transferability. Finality is the characteristic that debts can be settled with money. Freeman's model economy is setup so that outside money possesses …nality. Bech and Garrett (2003) have studied the distribution of payments within the day using a game theoretic approach. They specify a game in which a day is divided between morning and afternoon. Banks receive payment requests and strategically choose when the banks will release the funds to settle the payment request. In a collateralized credit regime when liquidity is costly, there arises a prisoners' dilemma where banks settle in the afternoon but the equilibrium is socially ine¢ cient. In a priced credit regime, there can arise a stag hunt game in which either all banks settle in the morning or all in the afternoon. Delay is socially optimal when the payment ‡ows are skewed towards the afternoon.
In this paper, we are interested in understanding how settlement is a¤ected in a payment system in which returns play a meaningful role. We specify a modi…ed version of Freeman's economy in which there are two production technologies. First, the choice of the production technology is tantamount to choosing when debtors arrive to settle their IOUs. Production decisions pin down the timing of the debtor's arrival in our model economy and the returns paid. In this setup, returns are higher for the late-arriving debtor than for the earlyarriving debtor, thus creating an incentive to settle debts in the afternoon. We do not intend to apply production returns to the ultra-high-frequency observations associated with the morning and afternoon settlements. Rather, we o¤er relative returns as one way that would account for non-uniform distribution of settlements within the day. In addition, the return di¤erential may mean that there are social costs associated with the early-arriving, low-return technology. Indeed, we demonstrate that these social costs bear on the desirability of implementing policy that keeps intra-day rates equal to zero.
Overall, our paper permits us to examine three questions. First, because Freeman speci…es a sequencing friction that is completely determined by nature, our model permits one to ask how incentives can in ‡uence the timing of debtor's decisions and, ultimately, the settlement process. For instance, if the debtor has the option, under what conditions would the debtor make payments before the last possible instant in a payment system?
The evidence is quite clear; the distribution of payments, perhaps surprisingly, are not concentrated in the last few seconds that the clearinghouse is open.
Second, we are capable of identifying conditions under which the demand for liquidity incurs a social cost. In particular, we show that the interpretation of the creditor's departure and their consumption timing are critical to whether the social cost is present or not.
If, for example, the creditor's departure is not tied to the timing of their consumption, there is no social cost. We call a creditor a Freeman-type consumer if creditors depart and then consume at the end of old-age. In contrast, for a Diamond-Dybvig type of consumerthat is, a creditor that consumes immediately after leaving the settlement location -then the planner may allocate less consumption to early-leaving than to late-leaving creditors because there is a social cost.
Third, we can assess whether monetary policy is su¢ cient to implement the planner's allocation. In general, the answer is no. The intraday interest rate, measured by the di¤erence between the par value and the resale value of IOUs, can not implement the planner's allocation because it is one price. Here, there are two dimensions upon which the resale value is operating: the tradeo¤ between …rst-and second-stage production and the tradeo¤ between consumption by the early-leaving creditors and all other agents. Some other policy must be used, such as contingent monetary policy directed at early-leaving creditors or a non-distortionary redistribution scheme.
In this paper, we relax the condition that nature selects both the measure of creditors departing the settlement site early and the measure of debtors arriving at the settlement site early. We characterize the debtor's arrival time as a decision problem, applying three key modi…cations. First, IOUs are production loans as opposed to consumption loans.
The production loans constitute a one-to-one mapping to the debtor's arrival time; more concretely, the …rst-stage technology corresponds to debtor arriving early at the settlement site and the second-stage technology corresponds to the debtor arriving late at the settlement site. With intra-day loans priced at zero nominal interest, there is an incentive for debtors to wait as long as possible to settle IOUs. 2 Second, the debtor faces an intertemporal consumption choice problem; old debtors derive utility from production. If the returns to production are positively related to time of arrival -that is, late-arriving debtors are rewarded with higher rates of return -then there is further incentive to delay arrival for as long as possible. Third, the debtor's production decision is a hidden action.
It is revealed at the central island so that moral hazard is not a problem. But, there is no way of knowing the production/settlement schedule at the time IOUs are issued.
In our decentralized economy, outside money is not necessarily the only means of settlement. As such, …nality di¤ers from the concept developed in Freeman's model economy.
Speci…cally, IOUs can be settled either with outside money or through an exchange of goods. As old creditors learn what speci…c goods they derive utility from, it is possible that old debtors provide them with those goods. Even if all IOUs are settled with goods, outside money is still valued because old debtors trade with young debtors in the same spirit as in the overlapping generations tradition; that is, money possesses the …nality property as the means to execute intergenerational transfers. 3 Three major results are derived. The …rst major result is derived in the context of the decentralized economy. We demonstrate that there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which some measure of debtors will choose to arrive at the settlement site early. In fact, we show that there are no pure strategy equilibria in this model economy. Two things drive the mixed-strategy equilibrium: essentially, there is an arbitrage condition. The debtors are indi¤erent between the return o¤ered by the second-stage technology and the combination of the return on the …rst-stage technology and gains made from purchasing discounted IOUs in the …rst stage and selling them at par value in the second stage. Insofar as the IOU is held from stage one to stage two and then settled at par value, the intra-period return on IOUs is greater than zero. In the decentralized economy, the mixed-strategy equilibrium has one important implication; namely, early-leaving old creditors will consume less than the late-leaving old creditors when IOUs sell at a discounted price.
The second major result deals with the planner's problem. Production timing dictates when goods are available for old-age creditors. Now settlement and consumption are potentially linked in a way not examined in Freeman's setup. Speci…cally, Freeman's studied a planner's problem in which consumption goods for old-age creditors were explicitly available from young-debtors only. In contrast, we propose a setup in which the supply of goods for old-age creditors is materially changed. The additional dimension lies between the …rst stage and second stage. We show that consumption smoothing across old-age creditors -that is, early leavers consume the same as late leavers -is the planner's allocation if there is no distinction between departure time and the treatment of the supply of debtor's goods. It follows that in this setup, the planner would choose only second-stage production to maximize social welfare. However, if one treats the creditor's departure time as akin to a Diamond-Dybvig consumption shock, we derive conditions in which the planner's allocation consists of both …rst-and second-stage production technologies in order to smooth consumption across the old-age creditors. Because early-leaving creditors must consume in the …rst stage, some …rst-stage production must be allocated in order to satisfy the planner's objective function, if the early-leaving creditors' consumption demand cannot be fully accommodated by an intergenerational transfer. Put more generally, the planner faces a trade-o¤ along the consumption dimension and the production dimension: At the optimum, the planner equates the marginal cost of shifting production from second stage to the …rst stage with the marginal social gain of allocating more consumption goods to the early-leaving creditors.
The third major result pertains to the decentralized economy and the planner's allocation. In general, the decentralized economy will not implement the planner's allocation. In Freeman's setup, the central bank can temporarily expand the money supply to relax the liquidity constraint to restore the planner's allocation. The optimal interest rate in Freeman's economy is zero because the friction is purely due to timing; it does not a¤ect the fundamentals. However, in an economy with Diamond-Dybvig type of consumption pattern, if the early-leaving creditors'consumption demand cannot be fully accommodated by the endowment of the young generation and the planner decides to allocate some resources to the …rst-stage technology, the planner faces a tradeo¤: there exist marginal social costs because returns to …rst-stage technology are lower than returns to secondstage technology and marginal social gains of the additional consumption goods allocated to the early-leaving creditors. The planner determines the optimal sizes of investments in both technologies by evaluating the tradeo¤. However, the decentralized economy fails to achieve the planner's allocation with any intraday rate for two reasons. First, the intraday rate a¤ects both the creditors and the debtors'intertemporal consumption cost and thus their choice of trade volume and production quantity. Adjusting the intraday rate cannot correct the distortions in both agents'intertemporal choices. In other words, we have too few tools to achieve the multiple policy goals. Second, as the debtors choice of technology is unobservable, the uni…ed market price of capital fails to re ‡ect the social cost of allocating some resources to the low-return, …rst-stage technology.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the physical environment.
Equilibrium in the decentralized economy is characterized in Section 3. The planner's problem is speci…ed and solved in Section 4. In Section 5, we characterize the role of the central bank, describing policies that would implement the planner's allocation. In Section 6, we brie ‡y summary our …ndings and o¤er concluding remarks.
The physical environment
We consider a modi…ed version of the payment system model developed by Freeman (1996) .
The key di¤erence is that young debtors can create capital from goods borrowed from creditors. In doing so, debtors can …nance their old-age consumption.
There is an in…nite sequence of time periods. Dates are indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; :::. At each date t, there are two subperiods. The …rst subperiod is marked by the timing at which creditors and some debtors arrive at the settlement location. At the end of the …rst subperiod, some creditors depart and the remaining old debtors arrive. There are I outer islands where I is a large, even number. The outer islands are arranged in pairs around a central island. Within each pair, there is a creditor island and a debtor island. There is also a central island. Here, an enforcement authority costlessly enforces all contracts. In addition, a monetary authority exists on the central island.
At each date t 0, two-period lived agents are born. There is a continuum of agents of measure one born at each date on each island. At date t = 0, there is a continuum of agents called the initial old that live for one period. Each island has a unique perishable consumption good. Hence, there are i = 1; 2; :::; I types of debtor and creditor consumption goods.
On the creditor island, the young born at date t 0 are endowed with y units of the island-speci…c consumption good. The creditor derives utility from their home-island creditor good when young and from a debtor-island good when old. We represent the creditor's lifetime utility as u(cy 1t ; cx 2t+1 ), where u is strictly concave in both goods. Formally, u j > 0, u jj < 0, lim l!0 u j = 1, and lim l!1 u j = 0, l = cy 1t ; cx 2t+1 ; where u j is the derivative of the creditor's utility function with respect to the j th argument. We further assume that utility is separable with u 12 = u 21 = 0.
On the debtor island, the young born at date t 0 are endowed with x units of the island-speci…c consumption good. The debtor wants to consume during both periods of their lifetime. Here, we assume that the debtor only wants to consume units of their homeisland good. Let preferences be represented as v(dx 1t ; dx 2t+1 ). The debtor's utility function is strictly concave in each consumption good. Formally, we assume the debtor's utility function is characterized as follows:
; where v j is the derivative of the debtor's utility function with respect to the j th argument. We further assume that utility is separable with v 12 = v 21 = 0.
The young debtor can costlessly travel to the creditor island at the beginning of each period to meet with the young creditors. The young debtor can costlessly transform units of the creditor consumption good into capital, here denoted by k, at one-for-one rate. The capital can be used to produce home-island consumption good. There are two technologies, …rst-stage and second-stage, respectively, available to transform date-t capital to date-t + 1
home-island consumption good. The production functions for the two technologies are f (k) and F (k), respectively. For a given level of capital, the return to the second-stage technology dominates the return to the …rst-stage technology. Formally,
for any k 0 > 0. At date t + 1, the …rst-stage technology matures in the …rst-subperiod whereas the second-stage technology matures in the second subperiod. Physical capital fully depreciates after one period. We assume that the functions f (k) and F (k) are strictly increasing, strictly concave. After meeting with the young creditors, the young debtor returns to his home island, where he will meet the old creditors who are randomly relocated to his island and the old debtors who just return to the home island.
When old, the debtors arrive at the central island either in the …rst or second subperiod.
The arrival time is determined by the maturation of the production technology. Upon maturation, the old debtor travels costlessly to the central island. If he has chosen the …rst-stage technology, he will arrive at the central island in the …rst subperiod. We refer to these as early producers. The counterparts are called late producers. Let denote the measure of early producers, while 1 is the measure of late producers.
When old, the creditor costlessly travels to the central island. With probability 1 , the old creditors will be asked to leave the central island after the …rst subperiod is over.
The likelihood that the old creditor will leave at the end of the second stage is . When the old creditors leave the central island, each old creditor is randomly assigned preferences for the consumption good of a particular debtor's island. We assume that the distribution of the preferences as such that the demand for debtor good is uniform.
The initial old debtors are endowed with capital. The initial old creditor is endowed with m 0 units of …at money. Let k 0 denote the endowment of physical capital that the initial old debtors possess.
The decentralized economy
In this physical environment, it is possible to illustrate how debtors and creditors might interact in a decentralized economy. For agents born at date t 0, both debtors and creditors will consume some of their endowment. Debtors would like to acquire some of the young creditors goods to …nance old-age consumption. However, young debtors do not have anything that young creditors want when they meet at the beginning of the period.
Debtors o¤er an IOU, purchasing some of the young creditor's endowment, transforming the good into capital and waiting for old-age production. By accepting the IOU, the young creditor gives up some of his consumption good. The young debtor then returns to his home island, where he can sell some of his endowment to the old creditors who are relocated to his island. The old creditors pay the young debtor using money. The young debtor then starts to produce with his choice of technology.
When old, both creditors and debtors go to the central island to settle their accounts using either money or real goods. Following Freeman, the key friction is that arrivals and 
Debtor problem
We assume that all debtors born at date t 0 are the same. Consequently, we can treat a young debtor's problem as identical, dropping the i subscript. Here, a young debtor chooses the production technology they will adopt, which determines when they will arrive at the central island. Note that young debtors are not permitted to diversify among their production choices. Young debtors always choose the technology that results in higher lifetime utility, taking all prices as given.
Early producer
If a debtor chooses to be an early producer, he has the following budget constraints when young:
where m t is the demand for currency, and h t is his nominal value of the debtor's indebtedness. h t is also the nominal value of IOUs he issues to a creditor to acquire capital from young creditors. Thus, p yt k t = h t = p yt dy t . The debtor will repay the creditor in the second period using either real goods or money.
An early producer arrives on the central island at the …rst stage in his second period of life, and he can trade with other creditors who needs credits or goods for IOUs. Thus, budget constraint for an early producer when old is
where b is the par value of the debt purchased by the debtor, is the discounted nominal value of one dollar of that debt. Note that under this constraint, debtors are capable of meeting their their old-age needs -consumption and settlement -through a combination of production, outside money and gains from IOU purchases. Money holdings by the old debtors need not be equal to IOU values. 5 The life-time budget constraint for the early producer is
The early producer faces a liquidity constraint in the loan resale market:
which says the early producer cannot borrow to purchase the IOUs.
An early producer thus solves the following maximization problem
The …rst-order conditions for the early producers are
where 1 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with an early producer's liquidity constraint. If the liquidity constraint is nonbinding, then the complementary slack condition is satis…ed if and only if 1 = 0. With the nonbinding liquidity constraint, note that
1 t+1 = 0 is satis…ed if and only if = 1. Alternatively, if the liquidity constraint is binding, we obtain a case in which < 1.
Late producer
If a debtor chooses to be a late producer, his budget constraints when young are
where the notation with superscript star means "late producers".
When old, the debtor will not be able to trade in the loan resale market as he arrives late. The late producer's budget constraint when old is
The late producer's life-time budget constraint is
A late producer solves the following maximization problem:
The …rst-order conditions for the late producer's problem are:
A debtor compares the lifetime utilities from using the …rst-stage and the secondstage technologies given the prices of goods, the resale price of the loan, and the fractions of debtors who choose the …rst-stage and the second-stage technologies, respectively. If
; all debtors will choose to be early producers; whereas if v (dx 1t ; dx 2t+1 ) < v dx 1t ; dx 2t+1 ; all debtors will choose to be late producers. If
, a debtor is indi¤erent to either of the technologies.
Each debtor is assumed to choose the …rst-stage technology with probability . By law of large numbers, a fraction of debtors use the …rst-stage technology and pay their debts early.
Creditor problem
Here, we formalize the problem solved by a creditor. For all creditors born at date t 0, the objective is to maximize lifetime utility. When young, the budget constraint is
In other words, the nominal value of the creditor's endowment is equal to the nominal value consumed of his own good plus any loans o¤ered to young debtors. We assume the debtors can buy from as many creditors as they wish, and they can buy arbitrary amounts of capital from a debtor. A creditor thus cannot distinguish whether a buyer is a late producer or an early producer from the quantity of capital that a buyer purchases from him. When old, creditors are randomly assigned to either leave the central island early or late. The creditor's old-age departure can a¤ect the trading outcomes. If the old creditor leaves the central island early, there is a chance that the old creditor and old debtors are not matched temporally; that is, some of the old debtors will not have arrived. Consequently, the early-leaving creditor faces the following old-age budget constraint:
where is the price that the old creditor sells IOUs and a is the proportion of the IOUs that is repaid early. In this way, the old creditor can sell the IOUs that are not redeemed and recoup at least some of the value. The proportion of the IOUs that needs to be sold on the resale market is 1 a t . The rest of the IOUs will be paid in full.
With these resources, the old-age creditor can purchase units of the consumption good from debtors (either young or old or both). We assume that creditors can trade debtor island-speci…c goods with each other on the central island. So if the IOUs are paid in goods, the creditors can convert it to his preferred debtor island-speci…c goods.
If, in contrast, the old creditor leaves late, there is no risk that creditor and his debtors will not meet on the central island. In this event, the old-age budget constraint for the creditor is written as:
where the late-leaving old creditor has the value of the IOUs, the value represented by the IOUs purchased in the secondary market, denoted by q. Together, these resources are used to purchase units of the consumption good. Let cx 2 denote the consumption by the late leaving old creditor.
The liquidity constraint for a late-leaving creditor is Substitute cy 1t ; cx 2t+1 ; cx 2t+1 using l t and q t+1 ; the …rst-order conditions with respect to l t and q t for this problem are:
where 2 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with creditor's liquidity constraint. Com-bining the two FOCs, we get,
If the liquidity constraint is not binding, then by (22) we have t+1 = 1 and cx 2t+1 = cx 2t+1 :
Equilibrium
All markets clear in equilibrium. The goods market clearing conditions at date t are
The money market clearing condition is
The loan market clearing condition at date t is
The equilibrium proportion of loans that is repaid early is
The loan resale market clearing condition at date t is
The …rst-order conditions and the market clearing conditions pin down the equilibrium amount of consumption goods for both agents, the relative prices of goods, the equilibrium ratio of early producers, and the equilibrium price of loans in the resale market. Proposition 1 shows that in the equilibrium, there will be a fraction of, but not all, debtors choosing the …rst-stage technology. The resale price of loan on the central island is always less than 1, that is, the liquidity constraint is always binding in the resale market.
Proposition 1 There exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, 2 (0; 1) and 2 (0; 1).
Moreover, no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exist.
Proof. Suppose = 1: Thus, all debtors choose the …rst-stage technology. From equation
(28), it follows that a t = 1: By the market clearing condition (29) ; we have b t+1 = q t+1 = 0:
The early producers will not gain at all from the resale market. Compare the life-time budget constraints of an early producer and of a late producer, a late producer can consume more goods when old. Thus, we reach a contradiction.
Suppose all debtors choose the second-stage technology; that is, = 0; then a t = 0:
The liquidity constraint of a late creditor implies that q t+1 = 0. The resale market will not clear. Again, we reach a contradiction. Thus, neither = 1 nor = 0 -the pure strategies -are equilibrium.
That is strictly between 0 and 1 implies that a debtor is indi¤erent to the technologies given the equilibrium . That is, a debtor cannot bene…t from technology arbitrage in equilibrium.
Now let us prove that 0 < t+1 < 1. Note that if = 1; the early producers do not gain from the loan resale market. Compare the lifetime budget constraints of the early producers and late producers and by the …rst-order conditions that
; the late producers'budget is greater than the early producers'budget when = 1: So all debtors will choose to be late producers, which contradicts the fact that < 1. If = 0; the early producers and late-leaving creditors have in…nitely large demand for the loans on the resale market, so the market does not clear. Therefore, the resale price of the loan is strictly between 0 and 1:
Intuitively, debtors follow a mixed strategy in order to satisfy the arbitrage condition.
Once at the settlement site, they can …nd creditors leaving early and o¤er payment at less than par for the IOUs. Because there is no default risk, the return to early production plus intra-period gains from the resale market equal the return paid to late producers.
Note there is payment-form indeterminacy in the gross settlement. Debtors are free to settle IOUs with goods, outside money, or any combination of the two. If a debtor settles IOUs with goods, he can buy home-island goods from the young debtors using outside money. Mills (2004) o¤ered a mechanism design explanation for why outside money is valued in Freeman's model economy; namely, that with memory creditors would accept goods at settlement from debtors. In our setup, outside money is valued for settlement purposes and for executing intergenerational transfers. We share the same absence-of-memory feature as Freeman exhibits. The key di¤erence is that memory-loss does not coincide with …nality of money. In Mills, the absence of memory was su¢ cient to render outside money, and by association the central bank, useless. In our setup, money is not necessary to settle IOUs and thus money does not satisfy Kahn-Roberds …nality condition. Despite the absence of …nality, outside money is valued because it serves two simultaneous roles: it can serve as the means of …nal settlement and it is the means of executing intergenerational transfers. 6 In the following sections, we will focus on the stationary equilibrium, or the steady state. In the steady state, prices and allocations are invariant to time. So we will drop the time subscripts. 7 
Planner' s allocation
We now turn to the discussion of the unconstrained …rst-best allocation, or a planner's allocation. We consider a planner's problem in two slightly di¤erent settings. The settings are distinguished in terms of how we model the timing of consumption needs of the earlyleaving creditors. In the …rst setting, we follow Freeman's approach; that is, early-leaving creditors do not have to consume in the …rst stage. We refer to this consumption pattern as "Freeman type creditor." In the second setting, the early-leaving creditors have to consume in the …rst stage. They do not value the consumption in the second stage. Such a setting captures features of consumption timing that may be present in the payment system. For example, one can imagine situations in which creditors require payment to …nance a consumption shock during the day. Because this consumption timing is similar to the ex post consumption shock studied in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we refer to it as the "Diamond-Dybvig type creditor."
Freeman type creditor
Following Mills (2004), we set up a social planner's problem as follows. max cy 1 ;cx 2 ;cx 2 ;dx 1 ;dx 2 ;k;k ;
The uniqueness of the steady state is not guaranteed. But the uniquess exists in some classes of utility functions and production functions. For example, log linear utility function and Cobb-Douglas production functions.
where is the weight of debtors in the planner's welfare function. The …rst two constraints are the resource constraints for goods x and y, respectively.
We denote the solution to the planner's allocation by cŷ 1 ; cx 2 ; cx 2 ; dx 1 ; dx 2 ;k;k ;^ :
It is easy to see that the planner devotes all resources to the second-stage technology because it produces more goods than the …rst-stage technology. That is, we havek = 0 and = 0: The solution to the planner's problem satis…es the following …rst-order conditions that describe the consumptions for each type of agents in both periods:
The planner treats the early-leaving and late-leaving creditors equally. That is, cx 2 = cx 2 .
An early-leaving creditor's consumption is not a¤ected by his obligation to leave the central island early as the planner can transfer him some of the produced goods at the second stage when production is completed. A planner can always use tax-transfer policy to reallocate the income to achieve the desired wealth distribution that satis…es equation (32).
Diamond-Dybvig type creditor
In this alternative setting, the planner has an additional resource constraint in the …rst stage of a period: the amount of good x available at the …rst stage must be large enough to accommodate the consumption demanded by the early-leaving creditors. That is,
With the additional constraint, the planner's solution is in one of the following three cases. 
where 3 is the Lagragian multiplier associated with (35). Because (35) is binding, we have 3 > 0 and, by concavity, cx 2 > cx 2 . Case 3: The resource constraint (35) is binding, and the planner's solution requireŝ > 0 and x < (1 ) cx 2 . The planner invests some resources in the …rst-stage production technology, and allocates the endowments of the young debtors and produced goods from the …rst-stage production. The …rst-order conditions are
and equations (31) (33) : (36) still hold in this case. Equation (40) is the …rst-order condition with respect to the measure of …rst-stage producing debtors; that is, the fraction of . The left-hand side of (40) is the net welfare gain from having an additional unit of …rst-stage production; in other words, the marginal utility to early-arriving creditors from the extra production less the marginal utility of less consumption when young. The right-hand side is the welfare loss, which is the di¤erence between the marginal value of smaller second-stage production to all other agents less the marginal value of creditors' consumption when young. (Note that the debtors'weighted marginal utility when young and old, 1 v 1 (dx 1 ) and 1 v 2 (dx 2 ) ; respectively, are equal to u 2 (cx 2 ). F (k ) is the total consumption reduced by shifting one unit of production from the second-stage to the …rst-stage. The loss of F (k ) is borne by the debtors and the late-leaving creditors.)
The optimal equates the welfare gain to the welfare loss. Also note that by equations (31) ; (37), and (38), we have the following equation for an early producer's intertemporal consumption decision:
In the planner's allocation, early producers and late producers are treated equally.
In contrast, early-leaving creditors and late-leaving creditors may be treated di¤erently.
To illustrate this point, suppose consumption allocated to the early-leaving creditors is strictly less than the endowments of the young debtors -that is, x > (1 ) cx 2 -then consumption of the early-leaving creditors can be completely accommodated by a resource transfer from the young debtors to the early-leaving creditors. Under this condition, consumption allocated to the early-leaving creditors will be the same as that allocated to the late-leaving creditors. In contrast, if the early-leaving creditors are rationed to consume the endowments of the young debtors or if production needs to be allocated to the …rst-stage technology to accommodate the early-leaving creditors'consumption, then we have cx 2 > cx 2 . Thus, early-leaving creditors will be treated less favorably by the planner.
Compare the …rst-order conditions for the decentralized economy and planner's alloca-tion. The following proposition summarizes the comparison between the planner's allocation and the decentralized equilibrium. We consider both the Freeman-type creditor and all three Diamond-Dybvig type creditors.
Proposition 2
The decentralized economy does not achieve the planner's allocation.
Proof. The comparison between the Freeman-type creditor and the decentralized equilibrium is straightforward. In the planner's allocation,^ = 0 whereas the equilibrium value has lying between zero and one. For Diamond-Dybvig type creditors, the planner will allocate zero measure to …rst-stage production in both Cases 1 and 2. Clearly, the decentralized economy will not implement the planner's allocation in these two cases.
In Case 3, the resource constraint for the early-leaving creditors is binding and the planner's allocation calls for^ > 0. Note that the planner's allocation calls for
; that is, the debtor's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is equal to one.
However, in a stationary equilibrium in the decentralized economy, debtors choosing …rst-stage production will satisfy the following …rst-order condition:
, in other words, the early-arriving debtor's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is less than one. Hence, there is no equilibrium value of that implements the planner's allocation in any of the Diamond-Dybvig economies, including Case 3.
There are two reasons that account for why the equilibrium in the decentralized economy is not identical to the planner's solution. First, in a decentralized economy, IOUs must be discounted to attract some of the debtors to arrive early, thus providing liquidity to those creditors who need to consume immediately. As a result, excessive resources are used in low-return technology in a decentralized economy. Second, in a planner's economy, the planner can transfer goods from the young debtors to the early-leaving creditors and compensate the young debtors when the second-stage production is completed. In a decentralized economy, the old creditors cannot buy more than what the young debtors want to sell, unless there exists a …scal policy that taxes the young debtors at the …rst stage at time t, and then transfers goods from the old debtors to the young at the second stage.
Social cost and the planner' s allocation
In a planner's economy, the early-leaving creditors' consumption demand might incur a social cost in the form of lost output. These social costs are observed in Cases 2 and Our task is to answer the following question: What central bank policies will implement the planner's allocation? Speci…cally, we are interested in determining if one particular set of central bank policies -those with the intraday rate equal to zero -can implement the planner's allocation. We examine how di¤erent central bank policies will a¤ect the equilibrium outcomes as the follows: The creditors and the debtors take , taxes, and transfers as given, maximizing their expected utility by choosing the volume of trades in each period and the production technology; the central bank chooses interest rate and a tax-transfer scheme to maximize the weighted-average expected utility of the creditors and the debtors. The central bank reallocates the pro…ts made through the discount window to the creditors and debtors as lump-sum transfers. The balanced-budget constraint is
We look for an optimal discount rate on the resale loan that can maximize the social welfare in the decentralized economy. We will discuss both the Freeman type of economy and all cases in Diamond-Dybvig type of economy.
Freeman type of creditor
With a Freeman-type creditor, there exists a discount window policy with = 1 that implements the planner's allocation. Consider the central bank that sets
will choose the second-stage technology. Thus, with = 0 and = 1, the central bank's balanced budget constraint becomes
With T c = T c , the central bank's policy can smooth consumption across creditors, achieving cx 2 = cx 2 . Moreover, the creditor's …rst-order condition
is satis…ed. Thus, with the zero-interest rate policy, the discount rate of the loan and the ratios of intertemporal marginal utilities for both debtors and creditors are identical to that in the planner's allocation. The value of T d and T c can be chosen in such a way that the marginal utility between two types of agents satis…es
Diamond-Dybvig type of creditor
We discuss three cases in the economy with Diamond-Dybvig type of creditors, corresponding to the three separate planner's solutions.
The planner's solution has an unbinding resource constraint at the …rst stage. The solution is characterized by the same system of equations as in the economy with Freeman type of creditors. The optimal discount rate is = 1, and the policy in the decentralized economy can implement the planner's allocation.
Case 2: (1 ) cx 2 = x and^ = 0.
Setting = 1 does not implement the planner's allocation in this case. To see this, suppose the discount rate policy = 1 and the tax-transfer scheme yield an equilibrium with = 0. The creditor's …rst-order condition with = 1 in the decentralized economy is
which is di¤erent than equation (33) for the planner's solution unless cx 2 = cx 2 . But with cx 2 = cx 2 , the equilibrium solution contradicts the planner's allocation with cx 2 < cx 2 :
However, there exists a discount rate less than 1 that can implement the planner's allocation. To achieve = 0 in the decentralized economy, T d can be set su¢ ciently low to induce all debtors to be late producers. The late producer's decision is independent of ; a¤ects only the creditor's decision. Next, set
so that the creditor's …rst-order condition in the decentralized economy becomes
It is easy to see that cŷ 1 ;k ; cx 2 ; cx 2 is the solution to (42), which is identical to (33).
, the economy can produce the planner's amount of output F k :
The central bank's balanced budget constraint in this case is
The left-hand-side is the total transfer, whereas the right-hand-side is the pro…ts made from the discount window. The tax-transfer scheme can be designed to achieve the desirable consumption allocation among all agents. Therefore, = u 2( cx 2 )
can restore the economy to the planner's allocation.
In this case, there does not exist a discount rate that can implement the planner's allocation. To see this, note that appears both in the early-producer's and the creditor's intertemporal consumption decisions, equations (7) and (23). Equation (7) is not identical to equation (41) in the planner's …rst-order condition, unless is set to be 1. With = 1;
equation (23) in steady state becomes
which is not identical to the intertemporal consumption decisions in the planner's solution (equations (33) and (39)) unless we have cx 2 = cx 2 . But it contradicts the fact that cx 2 < cx 2 in the planner's solution.
We summarize the discussion to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (I)It is possible to implement the planner's allocation in economies with
Freeman-type creditors and with Diamond-Dybvig type creditors and a nonbinding resource constraint (Case 1). Moreover, there exists a lump-sum tax-and-transfer policy combined with = 1(or r = 0 ) that implements the planner's allocation in these two economies.
(ii) For economies with Diamond-Dybvig type creditors and with the endowments equal to consumption by old, early-leaving creditors -that is, x = (1 ) cx 2 , (i.e., Case 2) -there exists a lump sum-tax-and-transfer policy combined with = u 2( cx 2 ) u 2 (cx 2 ) that implements the planner's allocation. (III) For economies with Diamond-Dybvig type creditors and with endowments strictly less than consumption by old, early-leaving creditors -that is,
x < (1 ) cx 2 (i.e., Case 3) -there is no discount window policy that will implement the planner's allocation.
The intuition behind proposition 3 is as follows. With a zero-interest rate policy, the central bank can implement the planner's allocation in both the Freeman-type creditor and the Diamond-Dybvig type creditor in which the early-leaving resource constraint is not binding. The reason is straightforward: in these two settings, the departure of the early-leaving creditors is a pure liquidity issue. In other words, the timing of consumption demand does not impose a social cost in terms of reduced total production. In order to provide timely consumption goods for the early-leaving creditors, the central bank needs, at most, to transfer goods to the early-leaving creditors. The optimal price of liquidity in the decentralized economy, r, is thus zero, as in the Freeman's original analysis.
In contrast, consider a case in which the planner's allocation requires x (1 ) cx 2 .
In this case, the early-leaving creditors'consumption demand imposes a cost in the form of less output. The social cost owes to two separate channels. First, as the early-leaving creditors are treated less favorably by the planner (cx 2 < cx 2 ) when the resource constraint is binding, the planner partially compensates the creditors for the consumption uncertainty by letting them consume more when young, which implies that the investment in the economy decreases, reducing output. We refer to this as the intertemporal consumption channel. Second, if the planner shifts some resource from the second-stage technology to the …rst-stage to produce goods for the early-leaving creditors, then the total output is reduced due to the low return on the …rst-stage technology. Here, we refer to this as production channel. As creditors cannot distinguish between early-and late-arriving debtors, they cannot sell capital at di¤erent prices to debtors who invest in di¤erent production technologies. Thus, there is one price of capital despite two types of production, and the choices of k, and k are both distorted. 9 When is the production channel operational in the planner's allocation? The planner compares the welfare loss of having the early-leaving creditors consume rationed amount of endowment of the young debtors (i.e. x = (1 ) cx 2 ) with the welfare gain of having all other agents consume the output from the second-stage technology. If the welfare loss is small enough, the planner will shut down the production channel. Mathematically, the planner's allocation has a corner solution with respect to . Otherwise, the production channel is operational and the planner's allocation includes a positive value of , increasing …rst-stage production and early-leaving creditor's consumption with^ set to equate the welfare loss to the welfare gain.
Although in the economy with Diamond-Dybvig type of creditors and
there is no discount rate that can implement the planner's allocation, a proper discount rate policy can improve the decentralized economy. The following numeric example illustrates the welfare in the decentralized economy, the planner's allocation, and the decentralized economy with central bank policies.
A numeric example (Diamond-Dybvig type of creditor)
In this example, utility functions are: v (dx 1t ; dx 2t+1 ) = ln dx 1t +ln dx 2t+1 ; and u (cy 1t ; cx 2+1 ) = ln cy 1t + ln cx 2t+1 : Creditors and debtors are equally weighted. That is, = 0:5:
Endowments: x = 0:2; y = 1: Figure 1 shows the weighted average expected utilities of the debtors and creditors (social welfare) in a decentralized economy, a planner's economy, and a decentralized economy 9 Hidden action is su¢ cient, but not necessary. Suppose that model were modi…ed so that debtors' production choices are observable. Capital sold to the late producers will be charged a higher price to compensate for the uncertainty that a¤ects old-age consumption. In equilibrium, the relative price of capital sold to the early producers and late producers is , which will appear in both the creditors and the early-producers's intertemporal consumption decisions. Again, we do not have enough policy tools to achieve the …rst-best.
with central bank policies. The blue line represents the utility in a decentralized economy, the red line indicates the utility in a planner's economy, and the green line indicates the utility under the central bank policies when the planner's allocation is not achievable.
If the fraction of late-leaving creditors, , is greater than …fty percent, then the …rst-stage resource constraint is not binding in the planner's allocation. That is, x > (1 ) cx 2 .
In the decentralized economy, the central bank will want to choose = 1 to implement the planner's allocation. This is why the central bank policy welfare line coincides with the planner's welfare line for 0:5. Table 1 lists the details of the decentralized economy, planner's allocation, and the decentralized economy with central bank policies for = 0. The consumptions and utilities of the debtors and creditors, and the weighted average aggregate utility, !; are as follows: Table 1 : An example of the allocation in a decentralized economy, planner's allocation, and central bank policies and the tax-transfer scheme, no debtors will choose the …rst-stage production. The chance of being treated unfavorably when old adversely a¤ects the creditor's consumption decision when young. The young creditors choose to consume more and sell less capital, which reduce the total production and thus the consumption of other agents.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine a model economy in which the arrival time at the settlement location is endogenous. Our setup can account for the distribution of daily payments observed at Fedwire and CHIPs. Given the size of the payment system, it is important to be able to understand why settlements occur mostly in the last half of the day. In our case, the rate of return o¤ered by assets paying in the last half of the day will induce most debtors to settle in the last half of the day in our model economy. Because there are arbitrage opportunities, some debtors will settle in the morning.
We build on the work by Freeman to account for the within-day distribution of settlements. Our modi…cation to his model economy raises additional issues about the role of the central bank and its policies. For instance, we derive conditions under which there is no intraday interest rate that will implement the planner's allocation. As such, these …ndings are in direct contrast to Freeman's result in which the central bank can implement the planner's allocation by setting the intra-day rate equal to zero. In Freeman's model, there is a transfer from early-leaving creditors to late-leaving creditors when no central bank is present and there is a binding liquidity constraint. The central bank can undo this transfer by providing liquidity, thereby rendering the liquidity constraint nonbinding. In our paper, the measure of debtors that arrive early is a decision that is commensurate to production timing. In the decentralized economy, the intra-period gains from the resale market are critical to induce some measure of debtors to arrive/produce early.
Our …ndings depend critically on the interpretation of when the consumer eats in relation to their departure from the settlement location. If, for example, creditors consume at the end of old-age, then our decentralized economy yields results identical to Freeman's; that is, central bank can implement the planner's allocation by setting the intra-day interest rate to zero. In this case, the planner's production decision is separable from the provision of consumption and the central can smooth consumption across old-age creditors through liquidity provision.
However, if early-leaving creditors are treated as if they must consume during the …rst-stage, then we have a kind of Diamond-Dybvig consumer. In the Diamond-Dybvig version of the model economy, the provision of timely consumption goods can be costly. To be more precise, if young debtors have a large enough endowment, then the planner'allocation consists of transferring the young debtor's endowment to early-leaving creditors. If the endowment is large enough relative to old-age creditor's consumption, there is no reduc-tion in output and the early-leaving creditors and the late-leaving creditors will be treated equally. Otherwise, either the early-leaving creditors need be rationed to consume the young debtors'endowment or some low-return, …rst-stage production is needed to smooth old creditors' consumption. In the former case, the reduction in output results from the reduced investment; whereas in the latter, the output is reduced because investment is reduced and further because some investment is allocated to the low-return, …rst-stage technology. In both cases, the planner solves the problem by allocating less consumption to early-leaving creditors than to late-leaving creditors. Regardless, we show that the decentralized economy does not implement the planner's allocation.
The resource constraint in the planner's allocation also plays a critical role in deciding whether there exists an intraday interest rate that can implement the planner's allocation.
If the …rst-stage resource constraint is non-binding, then a zero intra-day interest-rate policy will implement the planner's allocation. Basically, early consumption demand does not change the amount of resource allocated in the high-return production as in the planner's economy. We also demonstrate that if the …rst-stage resource constraint is binding and the planner rations the endowment of the young among the early-leaving creditors, then setting the intra-day interest rate equal to the ratio between the marginal utilities of being a late type and an early type in the planner's solution can implement the planner's allocation.
With a binding …rst-stage resource constraint and if some resources are invested in the low-return, …rst-stage technology, we show that there is no discount rate policy that can implement the planner's allocation. The discount rate policy alone cannot achieve the multi-goals in the planner's allocation, namely, the optimal amounts of production at both stages.
The driving force in this model is twofold. First, the link between production decisions and debtor arrival is one way to endogenize the distribution of timing in the payment system. Second, there are two types of production, di¤erentiated by returns. In this way, there is an opportunity cost to society associated with production (and arrival times) that the two production types is critical for what happens in the IOU resale market as well as the impact on the timing of debtor's arrival. With an IOU resale market, there is an arbitrage opportunity that can be exploited by early-arriving debtors. Our results suggest that intraday rates should not be zero if there exists social cost for the liquidity needs. At a fundamental level, we derive conditions under which zero intraday rates are ine¢ cient.
If these conditions are relevant, and we think they are, we should rethink the pricing of intraday credit.
